The Strait of Hormuz is portrayed as a vulnerable energy chokepoint, through which approximately one-fifth of global crude oil and liquefied natural gas flows in peacetime. Its closure since late February 2026 has disrupted an estimated 20 million barrels per day of crude oil transit, constituting what the International Energy Agency calls "the most severe supply disruption in the modern oil market".
A peer-reviewed study in Sustainability estimates that GDP losses from the blockade could range from $330 billion to $2.2 trillion, depending on duration. South Korea and Japan, with approximately 68–70% and 95% Middle East crude dependency respectively, are disproportionately affected.
Yet, in global commerce, a crisis for one can be an opportunity for another. The crisis reveals winners and losers.
Norway, Europe's largest producer of oil and natural gas excluding Russia, has emerged as the biggest economic beneficiary.
In March 2026, Statistics Norway reported that crude oil exports hit a record 57.4 billion kroner, approximately $6.08 billion, up 67.9% year-on-year. In April, exports reached 61.4 billion kroner, or $6.5 billion, an 86% year-on-year increase.
"The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused a significant supply shock on the oil market, which contributed to the high oil prices in March and thus the highest export value ever," said Jan Olav Rorhus, senior adviser at Statistics Norway.
Norway's energy surplus now constitutes 19.1% of GDP, while its trade surplus reached 97.5 billion kroner in March. Natural gas sales rose to 69.3 billion kroner, covering about 30% of EU needs. Its sovereign wealth fund holds approximately $2.19 trillion. The IEA warns that high prices are triggering "demand destruction" in aviation and petrochemicals.
The Northern Sea Route reduces sailing distance between Murmansk and Yokohama by approximately 55% compared with the Suez Canal route. But the Sustainability study concludes that even maximum feasible use would offset only 1.1–3.6% of total economic losses. Such use would require around 1,600 annual ice-class tanker voyages, compared with 103 transits in 2025, plus icebreaker capacity and port infrastructure unavailable before the mid-2030s. Its mitigation potential is marginal. The route is "insurance rather than substitution".
China’s Strategic Edge
China has emerged as another strategic winner. By March 2026, its strategic and commercial crude reserves had reached approximately 1.2–1.3 billion barrels, enough for about 104–180 days of net imports, above the IEA's 90-day safety line. Beijing had prepared for turbulence linked to the Trump administration and possible trade sanctions.
China has also remained Iran's primary oil customer, with average deliveries to Chinese ports at about 1.34 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2025. US sanctions on Chinese independent refineries, or "teapots", have begun disrupting this flow, and Iranian exports could fall by about 500,000 barrels per day. China nevertheless benefits from domestic energy security while maintaining its position as a major trading partner.
The Persian Gulf states, by contrast, face severe costs. The IMF projects Qatar's GDP will contract 8.6% in 2026. Doha has cut government department budgets by up to 30% and overseas aid by about 85%, while difficulties transporting LNG through the strait have disrupted its primary revenue source. Qatar and Kuwait are estimated to be losing $1.5–2 billion a week in energy export revenues.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have fared relatively better because pipelines bypass the strait. Yet about $106 billion in transactions in North America and Europe linked to Persian Gulf sovereign wealth funds are now in doubt as these funds prioritize domestic defense, infrastructure and food security.
The conflict has also undermined the Persian Gulf's appeal as a business base. Reports indicate that Deloitte and PwC have shuttered offices across the Persian Gulf, while Robeco moved Dubai-based staff to remote work. A German Chamber of Commerce survey found that only 21% of German companies operating in the Persian Gulf expect their overseas operations to improve, while 46% cite high energy prices as their main business risk.
For Iran, the question remains how long these "gains" for the few can sustain a global economy that is, on aggregate, clearly losing. The answer depends on whether the region can move from disruption to dialogue, a transition that remains distant.
